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With privacy concerns on the rise, the European Commission passed the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) which forces all software manufacturers to employ the 
privacy by design principles starting from the design phase of development. The privacy 
by design approach has been pushed into regulation as the ultimate solution by some, but 
very little information is given on applying the approach in practice. Very little infor-
mation is also available on enforcement of the regulatory side of privacy by design which 
makes evaluation of compliance difficult. 
This thesis explores the state of privacy by design implementation and attempts to formu-
late a model for adhering to the privacy by design principles in an iterative agile software 
development methodology. This model is fully integrated into the Scrum software devel-
opment model and provides the developers with an improved view into the compliance 
state of their product during development through employment of visual documentation 
practices. Additional focus is given to other regulatory demands of the GDPR. Compati-
bility with other privacy oriented development frameworks is also considered. 
Furthermore, this thesis explores the criticism and benefits on privacy by design from 
both an implementation and regulatory point of view in Europe and in other jurisdictions. 
These criticisms and benefits are evaluated against the agile integrated model. The state 
of privacy by design in the global privacy community is a positive development, but some 
global privacy threats are also discussed.  
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Huolen tietosuojan tasosta kasvaessa Euroopan Komissio hyväksyi yleisen tietosuoja-
asetuksen, joka pakottaa kaikki ohjelmistovalmistaja noudattamaan sisäänrakennetun 
tietosuojan periaatteita alkaen jo kehityksen suunnitteluvaiheista. Sisäänrakennetun 
tietosuojan lähestymistapaa on ajettu asetuksen ja sääntelyn piiriin lopullisena ratkaisuna 
tietosuojaongelmiin, mutta hyvin vähän informaatiota on tarjolla lähestymistavan 
käytännön hyödyntämisestä. Niin ikään hyvin vähän tietoa on tarjolla asetuksen 
toimeenpano- ja valvontapuolesta sisäänrakennettuun tietosuojaan liittyen, mikä tekee 
asetuksen noudattamisen arvioinnista hankalaa. 
Tämä diplomityö tutkii sisäänrakennetun tietosuojan toteutuksen tilaa ja pyrkii 
muodostamaan mallin jonka avulla sisäänrakennetun tietosuojan periaatteiden 
noudattaminen ketterässä ohjelmistokehityskehyksessä olisi mahdollista. Tämä malli on 
täysin integroitu Scrum-ohjelmistokehitysmenetelmään ja tarjoaa kehittäjille paremman 
näkyvyyden tuotteen määräystenmukaisuuteen läpi kehityksen visuaalista 
dokumentaatiomenetelmää käyttäen. Lisäksi malli tarjoaa etuja muiden yleisen 
tietosuoja-asetuksen vaatimusten noudattamiseen. Yhteensopivuus muiden tieto- ja 
yksityisyydensuojaan suuntautuneiden kehityskehysten kanssa huomiodaan myös. 
Lisäksi tämä diplomityö tarkastelee sisäänrakennettun tietosuojaan kohdistuvaa kritiikkiä 
ja kehuja täytäntöönpanon sekä sääntelyn kannalta Euroopassa ja muissa hallintoalueissa. 
Tätä kritiikkiä ja kehuja vertaillaan tuotettua ketterää mallia vasten. Sisäänrakennetun 
tietosuojan kehityssuunta globaalissa tietosuojayhteisössä on positiivinen, mutta työ 
pohtii myös joitakin globaaleja uhkia tietosuojaa kohtaan. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy is likely one of the most infringed basic human rights in the modern ubiquitous 
information society. A lot of public discussion has been revolving around the privacy 
threats of social media applications, always connected Internet of Things -gadgets and 
promiscuous handling of personal information, such as location based data, as a com-
modity. In a 2013 study, Rainie et al. found that only 24% of internet users said they are 
happy with the level of protection that current legislation offers to their online privacy 
[1] and a 2014 study by Rainie found 91% of American adults stating they had lost con-
trol over how personal information is collected and used [2]. 
Privacy by Design has been in the spotlight a lot recently with the passing of the Euro-
pean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It has reached almost a mythical 
standing as the one true answer to privacy engineering in certain outlets. At the same 
time, concrete guidelines for the application of privacy by design have been very scarce. 
There seems to be an apparent disconnection between the ideology and practice of pri-
vacy by design. 
The goal of this thesis is to explore the state of privacy by design in practice and its ap-
plicability in a software project using agile development methodologies. The approach 
to this goal will be through the study of existing research on the application of the pri-
vacy by design method, its problems and criticism, the regulatory aspects relating to it 
and the related privacy research. Based on this study, a model for the implementation of 
the privacy by design method in an agile workflow is created and assessed. 
In terms of research questions, the following questions are set forth:  
• What is the current state of privacy by design in the industry and regulation? 
• Is it possible to apply privacy by design iteratively in an agile software develop-
ment model? 
• How relevant is the privacy by design as a privacy engineering method? 
• What is the privacy threat landscape like currently? 
To facilitate the exploration of these questions, in Chapter 2 the methods and practices of 
contemporary agile software development approaches are presented as background. 
Chapter 3 dives into the theory of privacy as the relevant data protection and privacy 
terminology is defined, the privacy by design method is opened and examined, the stand-
ing of the privacy by design method in a regulatory context relating to the GDPR is stud-
ied and the relevant privacy risks are analysed. Chapter 4 sees the agile privacy by design 
model and the assessment requirements behind it defined and inspected. In Chapter 5, the 
2 
research questions are evaluated critically in light of what has been found during the the-
sis. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions of the thesis.  
3 
2. AGILE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Agile development 
Traditionally, software engineering projects were approached in the past using waterfall-
style methodologies like many other engineering sciences projects. Characteristic for 
these projects is that there is a design and planning phase, and an execution or building 
phase, which follow chronologically with minor overlap. This means that after the plans 
are made, they are more or less fixed and the execution simply follows those plans with 
at most minor changes. In theory, this allows planning different aspects of the execution 
far into the future, such as material deliveries, concurrent processes or employee sched-
ules. Ironically, anecdotal evidence has shown the opposite even in traditional manufac-
turing [3]. 
A much more realistic approach would be accepting the volatility of circumstances as a 
fact and using a methodology that embraces change [3]. This is the agile approach. Being 
agile means accepting that software engineering, information technology and business 
related to them are such fast-developing fields that a solution that was considered stable 
can become obsolete the next month as a much better technology is released or a new 
competitor enters the market with a ground-breaking product. As such, making far reach-
ing plans that need to be completely revised when they become current is simply wasteful 
[3]. 
The core ideology of most agile methodologies is based in the agile manifesto, which is 
a set of value statements. The four statements are “individuals and interactions over pro-
cesses and tools”, “working software over comprehensive documentation”, “customer 
collaboration over contract negotiation” and “responding to change over following a 
plan” [4]. These statements are also a social contract for the development team to drive 
the continuous improvement that makes the agile approach so special. 
At the most granular level of implementation there are a multitude of different agile prac-
tices, which are activities, policies or ways of working that are commonly considered to 
be core building blocks to implementing the agile ideology [5]. Many agile methodolo-
gies share some of these practices and leave out others. Which practices a methodology 
chooses to include generally depends simply on the aspects of the project that the meth-
odology emphasizes. Even if a practice is not core to some specific methodology, being 
agile means that if it is beneficial it may be worth adapting the methodology and using it 
anyway. 
Another view of agile is that it is the practice of “continuous risk management” [5]. In a 
traditional waterfall model, the risk mitigation takes place mostly during the planning 
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phase, and the execution phase consists of taking the planned actions with hopes that they 
are enough to avoid the identified risks. The agile approach however, embraces risk and 
actively combats it through continuous demonstrations of the direction the project is head-
ing [5]. The incremental steps allow making corrective measures if it turns out the project 
is headed towards the realization of an identified risk, and as decisions are not committed 
until there is enough information to support them, it is possible to make even large 
changes [3]. The agile approach also supports risk discovery through continuous commu-
nication and repeating reviews, all of which are an opportunity to steer the project away 
from potential pitfalls. 
2.2 Scrum 
Scrum is an iterative, feedback driven agile model for teams to organize around software 
development. The Scrum model is based on a repeating set of periodic activities that range 
from daily to spanning multiple weeks in duration. These activities have a defined struc-
ture and goals and their frequent repetition allows the issues that arise during the product 
development cycle to be tackled immediately and for the solutions to be incorporated into 
future cycles. [6] Figure 1 shows an overview of this iterative process. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the Scrum process 
2.2.1 An overview of the Scrum process 
At the start of a new project, the product backlog is initialized by identifying the expec-
tations placed on the product-to-be [6]. Usually expressed in the form of user stories as 
shown in Figure 1, they become items on the product backlog. The product backlog de-
tails the features to be worked on during the future development cycles [6]. These expec-
tations can be functional or performance metrics, but also design limitations or require-
ments external to the product itself, if there is a strong argument for them so early in the 
product lifecycle. The product consists of deliverable items which represent the tangible 
future outcome and the scope of the project. 
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Transforming a rough idea of the deliverable items into a product backlog often involves 
multiple avenues of customer input [6]. A large amount of this input takes place at the 
start of the product development, but it does not end at that. The product backlog contin-
ues evolving throughout the development lifecycle of the product, as it needs to represent 
the changes happening in the understanding of the product requirements. New items can 
be added to the backlog or removed if they become invalid. The stories behind the items 
can be vague at first, and as the development of the product advances, more detailed input 
allows the stories, and thus also the backlog items, to become more detailed and atomic  
[7]. This process is often referred to as product discovery. 
Once the backlog has a sufficient number of items of varying granularity they are priori-
tized. Prioritization can be done based on a multitude of criteria, but the main drivers 
should be to have the most important business-critical core requirements and their de-
pendencies as top priorities. This process interlinks with product discovery to an extent, 
as the items with more granular and detailed stories should be the ones that will be more 
highly prioritized. To keep the process lean, the low priority items do not need to be very 
detailed and too much work should not be spent on specifically detailing them before they 
are relevant [7]. This way the decision making is focused on items that are currently being 
worked on and making decisions about design details as late as possible helps avoid hav-
ing to make decisions with partial information. 
After the product backlog is initialized, it is time to begin the iteration through sprints. A 
sprint is a short timeboxed working period with its own backlog, a subset of the product 
backlog, whose scope is fixed at the start of the period [6]. The scope should be small 
enough that the development team can realistically commit to completing all the items on 
the sprint backlog in the allotted time. The items for the sprint backlog are prepared be-
forehand by selecting a set of items from the product backlog that are broken down into 
smaller, workable stories. This preparation is referred to as grooming and it resembles the 
initial forming of the product backlog, but the goal is to “prepare just enough items for 
the upcoming spring, just in time” [7]. The actual content of the sprint backlog is agreed 
on in a sprint planning meeting with the development team before the start of the sprint. 
During the sprint, the project team gathers in the daily Scrum meeting. The Scrum meet-
ing is a short stand-up meeting, where each team member spends a few minutes describ-
ing what they accomplished the previous day, what they intend to do today and if there 
are any obstacles preventing them from advancing as intended [6]. If any issues arise, the 
manager’s priority should be working with the team to remove them. The meeting should 
be short and the focus is on updating the team on the latest developments, not reporting 
to management. 
At the end of the sprint, the accomplishments are presented to the team and other relevant 
stakeholders in a sprint review meeting. In the sprint review, the completed work items 
are presented and reviewed to determine if they are functional and completed to the extent 
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of the definition of done for the project. Incomplete items are returned to the product 
backlog. [7] 
More importantly, however, the team organizes a sprint retrospective meeting, which is 
an opportunity to critically review the performance of the previous sprint and plan actions 
to improve the situation for the next sprint [6]. It is an opportunity to learn what worked 
and what did not, and to react to changes in the environment or process that affect the 
team performance before they have too much of an impact on the product delivery sched-
ule. The sprint review and retrospective can be the same meeting, but in practice it is more 
efficient to timebox both meetings separately as they have a different agenda and focus. 
This also ensures one meeting does not encroach on the other. 
The end of a sprint also marks the beginning of planning for the next one. This process 
repeats iteratively until the product backlog has been consumed or the product otherwise 
meets the criteria of the definition of done for all its deliverables [7]. Of course, this def-
inition can also change during development and it should be reflected like any other 
changes discovered during the process. 
It is often customary to bootstrap a new Scrum project by having a so-called sprint zero. 
The sprint zero is an opportunity to agree on the project framework details, ways of work-
ing and other project level details. The definition of done is one example of something 
that would be considered during sprint zero. 
2.2.2 Scrum project management 
Scrum defines two special roles in the team. First, the product owner is the person who is 
responsible for the content and prioritization of the product backlog [6]. They act as an 
avatar of the customer towards the project team. The second, Scrum master, is the person 
who is in charge of executing the Scrum activities. It does not mean that they do every-
thing, but that they make sure it gets done. The Scrum master facilitates meetings, keeps 
the team to the process and acts in a manager role to remove obstacles that hinder the 
team’s ability to perform [6]. 
The strength of Scrum comes from embracing change even on the process level rather 
than attempting to contain and minimize it. Instead of committing to a plan and a process 
that was made based on information that might be months or years old at worst when the 
time to act upon it comes around, Scrum encourages not making such detailed plans be-
fore the information is available [6]. This should not be mistaken for long term plans 
being completely forbidden, but rather taken as a stern reminder that the project environ-
ment is likely to evolve, sometimes very considerably, during the development cycle of 
a product. 
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The flexibility that Scrum and agile offer can become a shortcoming under certain cir-
cumstances. One of the more common worries with adopting Scrum has been recorded 
as the level of independence and expertise that it requires from the team to run the Scrum 
process without undue effort [5]. Improper application of the agile practices or seemingly 
applying them without a proper buy-in from the team can also lead to inefficiency and an 
unpleasant experience [7]. Mistaking agile or Scrum with the lack of need for planning 
can be another common misconception. On the contrary, in order to successfully commit 
and complete a timeboxed sprint, the few things that are planned need to be planned 
properly [5]. 
2.3 Other notable agile models 
While the development process described in this thesis focuses on Scrum specifically, it 
is important to acknowledge that in addition to Scrum, there are other ways of working 
that have their core ideologies based in the Agile Manifesto. Such methods are for exam-
ple extreme programming, Kanban and Lean. Much like in Scrum, continuous improve-
ment is important to the core process of each one and their core ideologies are very inter-
changeable. The process described in this thesis for Scrum should be applicable to an 
extent in other agile models as well, as the agile practices which enable each model to 
behave like it does can be brought into other models as well. 
2.3.1 Extreme programming 
Like Scrum, extreme programming is timeboxed through sprints or iterations with a prod-
uct backlog that is initialized at the beginning of the process. This is called an exploration 
phase where the team experiments with architectural choices and the backlog items are 
groomed [5]. 
After the exploration phase, comes the planning phase [5], which resembles the sprint 
planning of Scrum. The difference is that multiple iterations are planned ahead through 
estimation of when each backlog item could be addressed. In conjunction with the release 
planning, test scenarios are created to describe what is an acceptable product increment.  
After the planning phase, the team enters an iteration cycle where they work through the 
planned iterations towards the product release plan. After every iteration, the release plan 
is reviewed and updated with the latest findings, such as new feature requirements and 
bugs. Eventually, the team reaches an iteration after which the product can be accepted 
for testing, and through the productionizing phase a release increment is produced. [5] 
This differs slightly from the Scrum ideal of having a working increment at the end of 
every sprint. Of course, both models in practice can resemble each other more than this 
due to team specific process modifications. 
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2.3.2 Kanban 
Kanban originates in the 1940s factory processes of Toyota. The core idea of Kanban in 
software development is to treat development issues like raw stock moving through a 
manufacturing process. Each issue is assigned to a visual ticket which is moved through 
the development pipeline on a board as it progresses through various stages and teams. 
This board provides an instantaneous glance to the overall status of the development pro-
cess. Applying limits on the amount of issues that can exist in the same stage at one time 
then allows to identify bottlenecks and fix them early in the process. [3] 
Using Kanban with a product backlog is very similar to how Scrum is used in practice. 
The biggest difference is that sprints are used as timeboxed units of work in Scrum while 
Kanban revolves more around a continuous flow of work. Both models are largely com-
patible and it is often seen that the Kanban board is used to visualize work items in a 
Scrum sprint. 
2.3.3 Lean 
Lean software development takes the learnings from Toyota’s product development sys-
tem, also known as lean manufacturing, and applies them to the software development 
process. The lean system focuses on placing effort where it counts at the right time and 
reducing wasteful, unnecessary work or work that may need to be redone later. The lean 
system consists of seven principles: eliminate waste, amplify learning, decide late (often 
also expressed as just-in-time), deliver fast, empower people, build for integrity and con-
sider the whole [3]. 
In the lean terminology, waste is used to refer to everything that does not immediately 
increase the value of the end product, as higher customer value directly translates to a 
better product [3]. Waste can be obvious things, such as making plans or designs that do 
not get implemented or working on features that are not required at the time, but also 
more integral things in the development process like multiple hand-offs between teams. 
The goal in the lean methodology is to make the right product with minimal waste. One 
key aspect to minimizing waste is to avoid making decisions that require heavy commit-
ment equipped with only partial knowledge. This is very much like the agile ideology in 
general. 
Software development is often problem solving at its core. To amplify learning is to ena-
ble the exploration of various solutions to a problem, before making the choice on the 
final method. Regardless of the exact problem solution techniques that go into arriving at 
the solution, allowing time for understanding the problem space is a key aspect of work-
ing towards solving a problem effectively [3]. Each potential solution is an opportunity 
to learn more, and the accumulated knowledge will result in a better product in the end. 
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Delaying decisions until they are required is key to the Scrum method in addition to Lean. 
The world will likely change between the introduction of a problem and the discovery of 
a good solution. Thus, it is only reasonable to wait until decisions do not require long-
term predictions or commitments [3]. This requires preparing by building in room for 
change to minimize the waste produced when it eventually is required. 
Continuous delivery and team-oriented processes are also very core agile practices to the 
Scrum process. Integrity refers to the experience of how well a product fulfils the non-
verbal intimate requirements of the user and how smoothly the system works together at 
a conceptual level [3]. In a way, it is a measure of quality, where quality is a property that 
is observable only by using a product for a purpose. 
Finally, considering the whole is required to keep the direction of the system coherent. It 
is also required to balance the effort between different aspects of development. Without 
careful oversight, individuals and organizations are inclined towards focusing on the area 
of their own expertise and neglecting other aspects of a product [3]. 
These principles could easily be applied to any agile model on their own or as a whole. 
As such, the Lean principles are not exclusive to a specific methodology but rather a set 
of tools, like the agile practices. They can be used if the team feels they are beneficial to 
the process. 
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3. DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 
3.1 A definition of privacy 
Before privacy, its protection and the impact of technologies and methodologies is dis-
cussed, a sufficient understanding must be achieved on what privacy is and what the main 
terms related to the field are. There are multiple definitions of what privacy entails de-
pending on the field and context of approach. The European Convention on Human 
Rights states “the right to respect for his private and family life” as a universal right, but 
does not go further into what privacy of one’s life means [8]. One broad domain definition 
comes from Solove [9] as “the right for a person to be let alone”. This definition may be 
useful in a legislative or philosophical context, but a little too imprecise and bound in the 
physical world for this discussion. Also from Solove, however, comes the definition that 
privacy is the ability to limit the scope of personal information available to others [9]. 
This definition is much more workable in the context of data protection and information 
technology. 
Personal data is usually described as any information relating to an individual who is 
identifiable based on the given information [10], but the definition does not necessarily 
have to be limited to a natural person. Wuyts [11] points out an issue in this definition of 
personal data: under this definition, data which has been rendered unidentifiable warrants 
no protection. It is worth questioning if anonymous data constitutes such information, that 
it might be the subject of a breach of privacy, but that is a rather philosophical debate. It 
is however very unlikely, that in the era of big data and the ubiquitous information society 
meaningful data could be reliably made unidentifiable such that it cannot become linkable 
again [11]. Aggregation is one applicable method, but arguably the aggregated data is not 
the same as the source data. 
Based on this definition, data protection can then be taken as the means and acts by which 
the individual’s control over their personal information is enabled. These means are 
mainly governed by data protection legislation which describes the responsibilities im-
posed on and rights allowed to those who are granted legitimate access to personal infor-
mation by an individual directly or by proxy. Data protection encompasses both technical 
and non-technical measures which mitigate the threats that dealing in personal data pre-
sent to the privacy of an individual. 
In a perfectly private world, an individual would have complete and ultimate control over 
their personal information. This is not realistically possible, and exceptions to an individ-
ual’s right to control their personal information usually exist as governed by legislation, 
for reasons such as government databases (i.e. criminal or census registries) for example. 
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In other words, deconstructing the concept slightly, privacy enables anonymity. Anonym-
ity can be defined through its opposite: identifiability, which means that the data subject 
can be identified from a group of potential subjects [12]. Identifiability and anonymity 
are not static states, but vary based on observable data and the observed group of subjects. 
It is safe to assume that the amount of observable information only increases, as it is 
unlikely for a malicious adversary aiming to break the individual’s privacy to forget an-
ything [12]. Because of this, the highest possible level of anonymity in a system is always 
in the initial state. 
A concept related to anonymity is linkability of data. Linkability of two distinct sets of 
data means that an observer can determine with reasonable confidence the data to be de-
scribing the same individual or to be otherwise related, e.g. to the same transaction or role 
[12]. As an adversary is unlikely to forget key information, linkability is a particularly 
dangerous attribute especially from the perspective of data minimization which in turn is 
the most effective tool to preserve or enhance privacy depending on the perspective. 
Linkability of data can occur regardless of whether the contents of it are observable. For 
example, given a messaging system where the online-status of users is disclosed to their 
contacts accurate to the minute, a malicious user might follow the status changes of two 
users to determine correlation between their usage of the system. Thus, the malicious user 
can determine the users involved in the exchange of a message based on unrelated data 
or metadata provided by the system for a different purpose, without having access to the 
message itself or the network traffic related to its delivery. 
Pseudonymity is a slightly weaker state than anonymity. Pseudonymity refers to the usage 
of pseudonyms as identifiers instead of natural names or other inherently linkable identi-
fiers [12]. A pseudonym is a replacement identifier which cannot be linked to its holder 
without extraneous data. As long as the pseudonym ownership data is confidential, it is 
in principle impossible to determine the holder’s identity. This does not mean that the 
pseudonym could not be unmasked through linkability of data that it is used in conjunc-
tion with. Once a pseudonym is linked with an identity, so is all the data it has been used 
with, which makes the usage of pseudonymity a very volatile state especially as the 
amount of data and transactions it is used in grows. Transaction pseudonyms can be some-
what of a solution to this, where for every transaction involving the pseudonymous data, 
a new identifier is generated, which is at least initially unlinkable to any past identities. 
The data controller, according to the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), is defined as the entity who “determines the purposes and means of the pro-
cessing of personal data”. A data processor is an entity who performs the actual pro-
cessing of data on behalf of the controller, other than the controller itself. Additionally, 
the data controller is required to have a contract with the processor in which the details 
of the processing are defined, in the case that a data processor is used. [10] The data 
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controller and processor are often interchangeable when discussing matters relating to the 
processing itself, such as accountability and confidentiality. 
The modern approaches at data protection principles are largely based on the principles 
of the Fair Information Practice Principles, defined by the United States (US) Federal 
Trade Commission based on a report from 1973 [13]. The five principles defined are: 
notice/awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security and enforce-
ment/redress [14]. These principles enforce the data subject’s right to privacy as the abil-
ity to control their personal data. 
The notice/awareness principle means that data subjects should be given an opportunity 
to make an informed decision on whether they want to disclose personal information for 
processing [14]. For an informed decision, the data subject needs to know what infor-
mation is processed, how, by who and why. Details on other relevant information policies 
should also be communicated. 
Choice/consent specifically means that data processing should be based on an affirmative 
expression of consent from the data subject [14]. The easiest way to enact this is to only 
process data that the subject voluntarily has disclosed for processing. In practice however, 
this governs the secondary usages of data for purposes other than what was necessary to 
fulfil the original intent. 
Access/participation is the principle that ensures data subjects are able to review data 
about themselves. This means the data subject can verify the accuracy of information that 
is processed and exercise their rights to correct data or object the processing in a timely 
manner without hindrances [14]. 
Integrity/security is the data security principle. Basically, it means that the processed 
data stays confidential and is protected from unauthorized access, modification and de-
struction [14]. In addition, the principle imposes data controllers with the responsibility 
to keep the processed information accurate and truthful, as well as destroying or anony-
mizing it when it becomes obsolete. 
Enforcement/redress as the final principle states that the other principles are only useful 
if there are mechanisms to enforce them. Data controllers must be required to self-regu-
late, data subjects must be able to object unlawful processing and governments must pro-
actively protect the rights of individuals [14]. Additionally, data controllers must be 
properly liable for the breach of an individual’s rights. 
3.2 Privacy by Design 
Privacy by design (PbD) is the idea that for a system to be safe in regards of privacy of 
personal data, privacy must be considered starting from the very earliest designs of the 
system. It is not enough to bring privacy into the system as an afterthought. The term was 
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popularized by Ann Cavoukian acting as the Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, Canada. Even where it might be possible to add privacy in after the implemen-
tation of a system, it causes the overhead of the work required to assure privacy of per-
sonal data in the system to grow considerably larger. The financial implications of this 
overhead may jeopardize the thoroughness of the work, leading to compromises in data 
privacy. 
The core concept of privacy by design revolves around seven so-called foundational prin-
ciples as defined by Ann Cavoukian: [15] 
1. proactive not reactive; preventative not remedial 
2. privacy as the default setting 
3. privacy embedded into design 
4. full functionality – positive-sum not zero-sum 
5. end-to-end security – full lifecycle protection 
6. visibility and transparency – keep it open 
7. respect for user privacy. 
There is no universally accepted definition of what these principles mean in practice. This 
makes treating privacy by design as a methodology somewhat difficult. Much like agile 
methodologies and the agile practices that make them, there are a number of privacy prac-
tices, design strategies and technologies that could apply to a potential privacy by design 
method. The practical meaning of privacy by design may also vary based on the role of 
the definer and the relationship they have with regards to privacy. This is a common cri-
tique of privacy by design [16] along with the difficulty in interpreting these vague guide-
lines when attempting to put them into practice. 
3.2.1 Proactive approach 
Cavoukian characterizes the proactive approach as: “PbD does not wait for privacy risks 
to materialize, nor does it offer remedies for resolving privacy infractions once they have 
occurred – it aims to prevent them from occurring. In short, Privacy by Design comes 
before-the-fact, not after.” [15] This concept is in spirit the main driver behind privacy 
by design. Privacy risks are more difficult and costly to weed out from an existing system 
than one under design and even more so from a finished and deployed product than one 
still on the drawing board.  
This requires adopting a defined set of privacy goals and requirements from the begin-
ning. When the requirements are clear, the privacy enabling solutions that go into a design 
can be assessed against those requirements and potential weaknesses in the solutions re-
viewed and fixed before they become problems in production. Defining the requirements 
at the beginning also enables effective assessment of the privacy impact of any design 
choices before they are acted on, which in theory helps avoid introducing weaknesses 
through seemingly unrelated interactions of requirements. 
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However, defining such requirements at the beginning of a design process may prove to 
be difficult especially in an agile product development context. Doing this in practice 
would require knowledge about the scope and implementation of the system under design. 
Alternatively, the requirements would need to be very general and they could not consider 
the domain of the design process which they are describing. In an agile environment, the 
product requirements are likely to change and the same applies to privacy requirements 
of the product. 
The application of this method may also be hard to prove, as Bier et al. [17] argue. If two 
functionally identical systems are inspected after implementation, it will be impossible to 
tell which one applied the proactive design method based purely on their functionality 
and outputs. The principle is easy to understand and get excited about, but without prior 
experience with privacy issues it may be difficult to put into practice. 
The proactive principle also includes considering the technical details of the whole data 
lifetime ahead of time. The data lifetime spans from its introduction to the system from 
the initial source, through its effective usage and ends after its secure destruction when 
the data is no longer used. It is important to think about data destruction during design, 
because data that is stored, but not actively used, is still data in the system and imposes a 
security burden. For this reason, any technical security measures implemented should also 
consider the full data lifecycle. 
The data lifecycle may extend to external systems as well. If a controller releases data to 
a third-party controller, they should also extend certain key events along the data lifecycle 
to those external parties as well. For instance, if a data subject exercises their right to 
demand an obsolete piece of data be deleted, then that demand should be relayed to other 
parties also using that outdated data. 
Another valid criticism of the proactive method is that it essentially requires engineers to 
make prophetic predictions on the future. As even an engineer armed with the latest 
knowledge of the industry has limited capability to anticipate what the yet unmaterialized 
privacy threats may be [18], it does not seem like a fair requirement to place in a formal 
document. Additionally, developments in the collective societal opinion on what is an 
acceptable level of privacy may bring forth new technologies that would be considered 
intrusive in the current state, or worse, cause technologies that are considered acceptable 
currently to turn into something intrusive. The same applies to technical privacy 
measures, as for example the capability of an intruder to break current encryption stand-
ards is only based on current information and future discoveries may change things 
wildly. 
The same criticism also partially applies to the privacy impact assessment process defined 
by the GDPR. The privacy impact assessment is a threat discovery and mitigation tool 
designed to assess the relative benefit of processing personal data in comparison to the 
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risks it causes to the rights and freedoms of the data subject. Carrying out the assessment 
is mandatory in certain cases involving high risk processing. The privacy impact assess-
ment consists of the following: [10] 
• a systematic description of the processing 
• assessment of necessity and proportionality of processing 
• management of identified risks to rights and freedoms of data subjects 
• involvement of interested parties. 
 
Figure 2. Privacy impact assessment process. Adapted from [19]. 
In practice, performing the privacy impact assessment is an iterative process as is shown 
in Figure 2. However, the privacy impact assessment must be carried out starting from 
the earliest designs before any data is processed as outlined in the guideline by the Article 
29 Working Party [19], and as such the process practically requires the conductors of a 
privacy impact assessment to simply guess when it comes to implementation and opera-
tion risks. By the time a system is implemented, the information behind the privacy im-
pact assessment which originally legitimized the system might be highly outdated. Addi-
tionally, the privacy impact assessment is not worth anything if the data controller does 
not stick to the promises made to counter the identified risks [13]. 
3.2.2 Privacy as the default 
In Cavoukian’s original definition, privacy as the default states that the data subject’s 
privacy should be ensured without any action on their behalf [15]. In practice, this is often 
interpreted to refer to data minimization. A system should only ever require the minimum 
amount of personal data for the bare essential functionality [17]. 
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According to the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), data 
minimization requirements are poorly enforced despite them existing in the Global Pri-
vacy Standard since 2006. They go on to criticize the excessive focus on data minimisa-
tion as the ultimate solution. While it is very hard if not impossible to put technological 
controls on information after it has been disclosed to someone, controlled disclosure is 
the key to enabling many of the more engaging applications of data in the ubiquitous 
information society. [13] They argue for the focus to be on preserving the individual’s 
legal rights rather than avoiding data processing. The only effective measures are then 
likely to be implemented through regulatory oversight. It is still difficult to argue against 
the fact that data that is not collected does not need any further protective measures. 
Proper implementation of privacy as the default allows the individual to control how 
much information they wish to disclose. It allows controlled disclosure of additional in-
formation in order to provide optional but beneficial functionalities, without sacrificing 
future control over personal information. Effective and intuitive privacy controls are also 
called for in the working documents behind the GDPR [13]. 
Moreover, Bier et al. emphasize that even if a user’s informed consent to the processing 
is obtained, privacy as the default needs to be fulfilled for compliance with the principle 
[17]. ENISA also recommends for regulatory bodies to limit the extent that user consent 
can be used to enable arbitrary data collection [13]. The usage of consent as a catch-all 
mechanism of data collection goes against the spirit of requiring the disclosure of the 
minimal personal information required to provide the relevant functionality. Otherwise 
there might be an incentive to lock all but the most basic features of a system behind a 
requirement of the user consenting to unlimited data collection and processing. As Bier 
et al. point out, users would not be likely to suffer the degraded default operation mode 
[17]. 
From a regulatory perspective, the requirement of a purpose specification has been an 
elementary version of privacy as the default [17]. In general, modern data protection leg-
islation requires a specific cause for the collection and processing of personal data and 
having such cause is the exception. The default choice is that collection is prohibited 
without purpose and processing collected data is prohibited for anything but the specified 
purpose.  
3.2.3 Embedding privacy into design 
Cavoukian’s original vision for embedding privacy into design was to make privacy a 
core feature of any product being delivered. She further states that “privacy is integral to 
the system, without diminishing functionality” [15]. 
For privacy to be fully embedded into the design of a system, the design process must 
identify the relevant risks that may threaten privacy of subjects in the system early on. 
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The idea being that the sooner in the design process risks are identified, the more com-
prehensive mitigation can be built against them as well as allowing unnecessary work to 
be avoided. 
However, as the natural design process of new functionality is of an iterative nature, it 
may be difficult to identify risks that are specifically relevant to mitigate early on. Imple-
mentation of mitigations based on risks that were identified in early designs may end up 
with extra work done on outdated privacy measures for features that are no longer relevant 
in relation to the finished feature. To avoid this, the mitigations need to be integral to the 
feature rather than a separate protective layer. 
As an example, location based technologies which enable reacting to the user’s physical 
location in real time or near real time are commonly considered as processing sensitive 
information. To mitigate the privacy impact of using location based technologies, special 
consideration must be given to how that data is processed and stored. Mitigation actions 
for location data might include not transferring the location data out of the user’s device, 
masking the exact location by approximating addresses, truncating data or introducing 
noise, and not storing the location data for longer than the minimum time required by the 
process. Implementation of a heavy encryption layer early on would be wasteful if the 
final feature does not end up transmitting the location data at all. The exact appropriate 
mitigation actions always depend on the application of the data, and must be built into the 
process. 
The studies on the accuracy of the LINDDUN method by Wuyts suggest that identifica-
tion of relevant risks may be difficult for non-experts in privacy issues [11]. As most new 
functionality in systems in general is most likely designed by people who are not experts 
in privacy, the sufficient execution of this principle would most of the time require a 
privacy impact assessment from an expert who may be external to the design process. 
Design by committee carries a new set of issues into the workflow with it, but it may be 
hard to avoid. 
3.2.4 Positive-sum approach 
Cavoukian describes this principle as “Privacy by Design seeks to accommodate all le-
gitimate interests and objectives in a positive-sum win-win manner, not through a dated, 
zero-sum approach, where unnecessary trade-offs are made” [15]. The related ideal is that 
it is possible to find a common ground where both parties benefit without making undue 
compromises or sacrifices to e.g. individual privacy and implement systems in this space. 
When it comes to implementing privacy by design, it has been critiqued for its positive-
sum win-win pitch being too idealistic. Attempting to make sure that both parties, the 
service provider and the user, benefit from a data transaction, may lead to an incentive to 
upsell features in order to collect more data. Schaar argues that instead of avoiding trade-
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offs between conflicting interests, the focus on preserving privacy should always come 
first [20]. Using the German electronic health card project as an example, he speaks for 
allowing the cardholder to have ultimate choice over what data is stored on the card and 
what data is available to service providers. This would mean that a service provider can 
never simply dictate what data it requires, but has to work with what the cardholder is 
comfortable with. 
Bier et al. have a different interpretation of what positive-sum means in the context of 
privacy by design. In their view, positive-sum does not refer to conflicting interests of 
separate parties but the internal conflict of adding functionality and reducing privacy in a 
system [17]. It essentially states that a functionality may only be added if it has no nega-
tive privacy effects no matter how small.  
A problem with this kind of definition is that applying it requires functionality and privacy 
to be quantifiable. Quantifying abstract concepts like this would require defining a meas-
ure for them which would without a doubt be a subjective process. Methods such as k-
anonymity have been used in research [11], but they depend on the specific anonymity 
group for the quantification and are difficult to generalize. Furthermore, the definition is 
a logical contradiction from the sense of building something new. Strictly following it 
would forbid ever adding personal information to a system as it would lower privacy from 
the total anonymity of the initial state, as Bier et al. themselves point out [17]. 
A requirement like the positive-sum approach is difficult to formalize, and it is easy to 
join in the critique of it being very idealistic and providing little gain from the perspective 
of the individual’s privacy. It may be best to forgo it as a redundant reminder that func-
tionalities should be constructed in such a way that they cause minimal negative impact 
on privacy and that added functionality should ultimately be to the benefit of the data 
subject. 
3.2.5 Full lifecycle security 
“Privacy by Design ensures cradle to grave, secure lifecycle management of information, 
end-to-end”, Cavoukian describes the full lifecycle principle. She goes on to point out 
that no privacy can exist if there is no security to ensure confidentiality. [15] It is easy to 
agree that data security is an important aspect of privacy even without privacy by design. 
It is not defined how privacy by design ensures this full lifecycle security for data, how-
ever. This principle seems to act more as a reminder that data security still matters, rather 
than a design guiding ideal like the other principles. It may not always be possible to 
foresee the full lifecycle for data in a system, considering that systems may be very com-
plex with multiple in and outflows of data and external dependencies, which may also 
make measuring success difficult. 
19 
Bier et al. point out that while it may be possible to formally prove the security of an 
individual low-level module, it is a completely different undertaking to prove the security 
of a system built from those modules. [17] Thus, verifying that this principle has been 
followed may be difficult if not impossible in the end other than through a thorough re-
view of the implemented security measures. 
It is important however, to not get too hung up on technical protections as a guarantee of 
confidentiality. Privacy-enhancing technologies alone cannot guarantee privacy, espe-
cially if they are merely a few components embedded as a part of a large infrastructure in 
a system [13]. While data security is in large part the application of correct technologies, 
the policies that govern the operative side are equally important to confidentiality. This 
side of a system is even more difficult to formally validate. 
3.2.6 Transparency 
Cavoukian states that “Privacy by Design seeks to assure all stakeholders that whatever 
the business practice or technology involved, it is in fact, operating according to the stated 
promises and objectives, subject to independent verification” [15]. This principle is very 
well in line with current data protection legislation in general and the concepts of inform-
ability and controllability. 
As privacy was defined as the ability for a person to retain control over the disclosure of 
their personal information, naturally exercising this ability requires awareness of this per-
sonal information being processed in the first place. Informing the data subject of the 
processing when the processing happens as a direct consequence of the subject’s actions 
is fairly straightforward, but it can get more difficult in indirect cases. The GDPR, for 
one, specifies that data subjects must be given specific information on how they can ex-
ercise their rights [10]. 
ENISA outlines the avenues of transparency in addition to the data subject as data pro-
cessors being accountable to their controllers and data protection authorities who need to 
supervise compliance and enforce regulations [13]. They deem the current standard level 
of transparency insufficient and point out that the systems processing personal infor-
mation are growing more complex. In the era of the ubiquitous information society, the 
amount of personal data and applications that rely on it to function are likely to continue 
growing. 
Transparency is a special case also in the sense that instead of relying on technological 
solutions, it is based wholly on the correct information being available to be shared. Ad-
ditionally, the personal impact of the communication may vary a lot from person to per-
son, as well as preferences on the scope of the communication. Transparency-enhancing 
technologies can aid in communicating about the facts of the processing at several differ-
ent levels of granularity as well as empowering data subjects to control their own privacy 
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through intuitive dashboards for example. [13] Formal audits can also be a method to 
communicate transparency, depending on who the stakeholders of the information are. 
Information about responsibilities, requirements and the evaluation criteria and methods 
for measuring compliance should be openly available. Freedom of information enables 
independent review of the design and its privacy features as well as the policies surround-
ing data privacy in the system. While this level of transparency is not a requirement of 
the GDPR for example, it is heavily encouraged. However, sometimes regulatory de-
mands are at odds with each other which prevents transparency from working, as an ex-
ample law enforcement databases [13]. 
When data processing is performed based on the consent of the data subject, transparency 
becomes especially important and is required for the subject to be able to give informed 
and free consent at all. The GDPR expands on the specifics of consent and in their opinion 
(15/2011) the EU Article 29 working party have outlined that only informed consent is 
considered valid. In specific, this means that “all the necessary information must be given 
at the moment the consent is requested, and that this should address the substantive as-
pects of the processing that the consent is intended to legitimise” [21]. 
3.3 Privacy by Design in legislation 
The same values that are behind the privacy by design ideology have been influencing 
the direction of evolution legislation and regulation related to data protection in recent 
years. Language similar to parts of Cavoukian’s privacy by design manifesto requiring 
sufficient technical safeguards be implemented by certain data controllers can be found 
in various US and EU legislative acts or directives. [18] Upcoming legislative data pro-
tection reforms in the EU will take this trend one step further by directly influencing the 
software and systems design and manufacture processes with almost universal require-
ments to employ privacy enhancing methodologies and technologies during design and 
implementation of systems that involve personal data [10]. 
Lack of such legal empowerment of the privacy by design methodology in the design 
process has been one source of criticism of privacy by design as a true solution [13]. 
Without emphasis on design, policies and overarching consideration for privacy as the 
right of a person, privacy solutions in the industry have tended to gravitate towards the 
implementation of easily marketable and replicable technical solutions for data security 
while ignoring the political and moral aspects of data protection and privacy  [18]. This 
can be somewhat seen in the recent uproar of public debate and controversy relating to 
mass surveillance conducted by technical means as a valid tool for e.g. police work and 
calls for backdoors or reduced-effectiveness encryption in consumer devices. Consumer 
privacy advocate organizations such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation have been call-
ing attention to the privacy violations regularly occurring at border crossings in the US 
where border control agents can arbitrarily coerce travellers to bypass technical privacy 
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measures through blackmail with the threat of detention [22]. Issues like these paint a 
view of the current political and regulatory landscape of privacy as a right of an individual 
as compared to a collection of technical measures required by industry standards. 
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office started a program in 2008 to encourage pri-
vacy by design adoption in private and public organisations. They call for a higher man-
date to apply privacy by design and privacy impact assessments during design and oper-
ation of systems. Furthermore, they speak for promoting privacy by design to also con-
sider organizational changes. [16] The details of how such evolution of the principles 
might happen are still open. ENISA, likewise, petitions policymakers to push for periodic 
privacy assessments by independent agencies [13]. They also urge for the development 
of privacy engineering tools that are easier and more intuitive to apply and better defined. 
In April 2016, The European Commission approved the new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) which is going to replace the current Data Protection Directive [10]. 
The regulation is a result of the data protection reform that has been in works since early 
2012. The core drivers of the reform were to unify the regulation and supervisory bodies 
across EU nations, unify and improve the rights of EU citizens, bring additional transpar-
ency to data processing. Additionally, a “one-stop shop” approach was pitched to provide 
support and ease of regulation for emerging technologies and digital commerce. The reg-
ulation directly supersedes the old directive as well as national legislation as the authori-
tative source of data protection legislation. It will be directly enforceable in all EU nations 
after May 2018 as well as certain foreign entities when they process personal data of EU 
citizens [10]. 
While the broadest terms of the regulation, such as the definition of personal data, are 
compatible with current legislation in Finland, many changes are also to be implemented. 
Such changes at a glance include more strict requirements for consent, requirement for 
the establishment of a data protection officer in certain organizations, EU-wide unified 
sanctions for incompliance and the inclusion of systems development and vendors di-
rectly into the data protection process. 
A piece of legal criticism on privacy by design that the GDPR does not directly answer 
concerns the translation of law into code. There is an apparent disconnection between the 
law text that describes the principles and processes having to be specific enough to be 
translatable into a concrete implementation in code or design by an engineer and yet flex-
ible and broad enough that it will sufficiently answer future technical and sociological 
issues that may threaten privacy [18]. It is however worth questioning if the translation 
of the spirit of law text into code should even be attempted. The law is always interpreted 
by a human reader to judge whether it has been breached, and it is not likely that computer 
assisted judgements, case summaries or profiling would stray far from this requirement 
in the near future. As such, it might be sufficient for the law governing privacy preserving 
systems design and implementation to give borderline requirements and define the criteria 
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through which an educated human reader can infer the absolute requirements concerning 
their system under design. Writing law text so specific that it is translatable to code with-
out room for interpretation would most likely also cause conflicts with many unforeseen 
domain specific issues. These issues would then need exceptions implemented into the 
law, and the maintenance burden on further additions to this law might quickly grow out 
of hand. The GDPR does reserve the option for amendments to be passed into the regu-
lation with more specific current implementation guides and requirements in response to 
emerging privacy threats, that are in line with the framework of the law [10]. 
Another noteworthy problem with enforcing privacy by design as a framework defined 
in law is assignment of accountability and liability. If a data controller does not design 
their own systems, but outsources their implementation, they might not know the details 
of the manufacture process. They might be simply users of a system sourced from a com-
pletely different legal environment [18]. As the ultimate victim of a data breach would 
most likely be a person who may not even be a direct customer of the data controller, 
tracing down the responsible party may lead into a complex web of contracts between 
private enterprises. 
Placing the conformance liability with manufacturer would simplify the handling of man-
ufacturing defects and errors that lead to regulation violations. This would, however, 
cause jurisdictional issues as in the case of Software as a Service, for example, the soft-
ware with the defect could be provided for use from a jurisdiction where the liability 
scheme is different. It would also place domestic businesses at a disadvantage in the 
global market. 
The other option is placing the exclusive and ultimate responsibility with the data con-
troller. In many cases this means that the controller will still depend on assurances from 
the manufacturer to display conformance with design requirements in the case of sourced 
systems. This simplifies the overall liability from the point of view of the law, as the data 
controller must organize the processing in such a way that they can show that privacy by 
design aspects have been considered regardless of how the processing is implemented. 
The privacy by design requirements would still transitively fall to the manufacturer 
through business requirements and this would enable the industry to practice a form of 
self-regulation. 
The GDPR takes somewhat of a hybrid approach to liability. The data controller is ulti-
mately liable, but data processors commissioned by a controller to perform the processing 
will be equally liable under the law. This sort of a business relationship must be based in 
a written contract that specifies the nature of the processing and the relationship of the 
entities. Additionally, there are references to a certification framework, which would al-
low businesses to proactively show conformance to the process. [10] The details of the 
certification framework still seem to be in a state of flux regarding who would perform 
them and what the certification process requires. 
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How specifically a data controller must prove usage of privacy by design is still also an 
important open question regarding liability. No precedent exists yet for how the design 
and implementation process must be documented to show application of the privacy prin-
ciples. Likewise, no precedent exists for how these privacy qualities should be presented 
in a system. Certification guidelines may be one answer, when the certification frame-
work gets defined further. For now, it is important to be prepared to show best effort 
compliance through employing a defined process and documentation artefacts. 
It is also unknown what are the specific processes that are acceptable to base decisions 
about privacy enhancing technologies on. Many processes exist for threat discovery, such 
as STRIDE or LINDDUN, but these may not discover all relevant threats even when 
employed by experts [11]. The Article 29 Working Party provides one interpretation of 
the impact assessment process in their 2017 guideline publication, but go on to state that 
it is not formally defined in the GDPR [19]. 
3.4 Current top risks to privacy 
Visibility into the state of the industry is important when discussing measures that might 
impact the situation positively or negatively. The Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP) maintains a list of the top 10 risks to privacy in web applications and the risks 
ordered as found on the 2014 revision are as follows: [23] 
1. web application vulnerabilities 
2. operator-sided data leakage 
3. insufficient data breach response 
4. insufficient deletion of personal data 
5. non-transparent policies, terms and conditions 
6. collection of data not required for the primary purpose 
7. sharing data with a third party 
8. outdated personal data 
9. missing or insufficient session expiration 
10. insecure data transfer. 
Vulnerabilities in application implementation take the first spot deservedly, even if it 
stands here as a catch-all category of sorts. No matter how bespoke the security mecha-
nisms in an application are, they are not worth much if they are improperly implemented. 
The basics of privacy are laid in data security. Likewise, even the best policies will do 
little to mitigate risks if they are not exercised in the implementation. Having sound op-
erational practices and ways to audit their effectivity will also go a long way towards 
mitigating this risk.  
Several of these risks can be directly linked to a failure to employ proper data minimisa-
tion practices, either through collecting and storing extraneous data or releasing too much 
data through poor access control. Almost all of the issues listed are related to improper or 
insufficient employment of data protection principles in general. Many of these also have 
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a regulatory impact through compliance failures or bad governance. The risks that are 
discussed here in further detail are operator-sided data leakage, insufficient data breach 
response, storage of extraneous data and lack of transparency in policies as they have a 
strong presence in the privacy by design and data protection principles of the GDPR. 
With cloud based PaaS and IaaS adoption growing, an increasing amount of systems is 
relying on external operators to hold up their end of the privacy requirements. This in-
creases the likelihood of an error on the operator’s side. Of course, with more data resting 
in the operator’s systems there is also more opportunity for malicious activity from an 
internal actor. If relying on an external operator is the only option, the main mitigation 
for this risk is proper vetting of the operator’s reputation and procedures [23]. Many cloud 
service providers base the viability of their operation on access to a large amount of ca-
pacity in server farms, which may be located in various jurisdictions [24]. Acting as a 
data controller for a system built on a platform like this may be a precarious undertaking 
without full understanding of the various aspects of international data protection and a 
level of control over the implementation of the platform’s operation. 
3.4.1 Data migration to external operators 
In reference to external operators, it is worthwhile to discuss the regulatory aspects of 
global operation from a European perspective in relation to the vast amount of cloud ser-
vice providers located in the US. On October 6, 2015, the European Court of Justice 
judged that the safe harbour statutes are invalid due to internal conflicts with the European 
data protection directive. The safe harbour statutes had been the source of legitimacy for 
businesses located in the US who provide services requiring the transfer of personal in-
formation from the European economic area. [25] This judgement has shown that mere 
regulatory compliance based on the existence of international frameworks governing pri-
vacy protection is not sufficient proof that the entities taking part in processing under the 
framework are complying with the limitations outlined within. In this case specifically, 
there was a concern that the US-based businesses could not guarantee the privacy of Eu-
ropean data subjects. Due to the domestic authority of the US National Security Agency 
to perform covert intelligence operations, operator-sided data leakage which could be 
considered unauthorized from the data subject’s jurisdiction could not be ruled out [25]. 
Since the invalidation of the framework coincided with the regulatory work of creating 
the GDPR, the Article 29 Working Party clarified that similar mechanics to the ones gov-
erning the relationship of a data controller and a data processor might be employed to 
satisfy the court’s standard [25]. These mechanisms are the standard contractual clauses 
and binding corporate rules, which are an organisation-level contract to accept the regu-
latory liabilities for processing personal data in a manner compliant with the European 
legislation [24]. 
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The GDPR does allow international transfers under certain terms, even without standard 
contractual clauses or binding corporate rules, to countries which have been deemed to 
have sufficient levels of data protection in their own legislation in a manner compatible 
with the European legislation. Notably, the US does not have a national data protection 
law and thus cannot be adequate under this rule. [24] Even if the US had a national data 
protection law, it might not be adequate due to the authority of the domestic intelligence 
agencies which exceeds the rights of private individuals. As a partial resolution, Varotto 
[25] calls for the founding of an inter-governmental body to regulate data protection in-
ternationally and to act as an accountability agency for countries acting under the ade-
quacy rule. 
To summarize, when considering external operators, individual research and audits are 
good practice. Acceptance of external operators should not be based purely on compli-
ance with framework agreements, but individual contracts between organisations. These 
contracts must outline the liabilities that arise from handling personal information. 
3.4.2 Data breach response 
In the event a data breach does occur, the data controller’s response can do much to aid 
in either mitigating the impact or worsening it. Under the GDPR, a personal data breach 
is defined as “a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, 
alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or 
otherwise processed” [10]. There are four phases to a proper response to a data breach: 
detection, notification, mitigation and improving. 
Detection of a data breach may happen multiple ways. In the best-case scenario, proactive 
intrusion detection systems and audit log monitoring alert operators to the fact that a 
breach is ongoing. A notification may also come from an external party, such as a security 
researcher or a data protection authority, in which case it needs to be verified. The worst-
case scenario is that suspicions of a data breach arise after leaked data is discovered al-
ready in public circulation. Early detection is important in order to allow fast response 
and effective mitigation. Without detection, a data breach cannot be responded to at all. 
Notification of a breach must be given to the supervisory authority within 72 hours of 
detection under the GDPR [10]. Technically the notification can be avoided if the data 
controller can determine that the breach will not result in a “risk to the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons” [10], but it is unlikely that an organization could perform an exhaus-
tive verification of the risks a breach imposes so quickly [24]. There is no harm in giving 
a notice to the supervisory authority in either case. In certain cases, if there is a high risk 
to a person, the notice should also be given directly to the data subjects affected [10]. 
The notification itself must describe the breach, giving as accurate details as possible on 
the type and volume of data involved as well as the amount of affected data subjects. 
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Additionally, the notice must include information and contact details on where more in-
formation about the breach can be inquired. The notice must include an assessment of the 
consequences that the breach is likely to cause as well as the measures that were or will 
be taken in response to the data breach, such as mitigative actions to the identified risks. 
[10] The notice may be amended iteratively as more details come available. This process 
is also in line with the implementation of an incident response plan as required by stand-
ards such as ISO 27001, ISO 22301 and Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
for example. [24] For an organization prepared to meet the responsible incident manage-
ment criteria of these standards, the notification phase should be an easy addition. 
Mitigation of the data breach begins with the notification, as awareness of loss of control 
over personal data enables the affected individuals to respond accordingly. Other mitiga-
tive actions depend largely on the type and amount of data that was affected by the breach. 
Another important factor in deciding the appropriate mitigative actions is the length of 
time from the breach to detection, as the longer the breach took to detect, the more likely 
it is that it has led to further exploitation. Using breach assessment frameworks such as 
ENISA’s severity assessment method may be helpful to understand the proportions and 
potential of a breach [26]. The data controller must evaluate the risks to data subjects and 
others and act accordingly to mitigate the effects and prevent potential follow-up abuse 
of leaked data for example. These actions need to be documented and they need to have 
someone named responsible for overseeing their implementation. 
Improving policies and processes to learn from breaches to avoid them in the future is the 
last thing to do after the breach has been resolved. This means organizing a retrospective 
debriefing with everyone involved in the spirit of continuous improvement, after the acute 
issues have been taken care of and some time for monitoring has been allowed. [27] The 
key questions to look at are what happened, why it was possible, how well was the re-
sponse executed and could anything have been done better either before, during or after 
the breach. 
3.4.3 Lack of compliance 
Failure to remove obsolete data and collection of extraneous data both lead to data exist-
ing in a system without a legitimate basis for it. Such data, in addition to being a legal 
burden, poses a huge risk in case of a data breach. In the case of failure to delete, there 
are two clear options of how this risk might realize: the system holds personal data that 
is not known about and thus not deleted, or the system holds personal data that is known, 
but proper deletion is neglected. 
In the case that data is not known about, there has been an issue with data flow and lifecy-
cle management, as the personal data affected has entered a state that was not originally 
planned. This is the case even if there was no plan. This is one of the situations that proper 
employment of data minimization and other privacy by design practices during system 
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design is meant to mitigate. The general mitigation against it is simply ensuring storage 
or transfer of personal data in unintended states is guarded against by reviews of design, 
implementation and documentation. 
In the case that destruction of obsolete data was knowingly ignored or that extraneous 
data was processed against the specified purpose, there may be a conflict between the 
actual intended purpose of the system and the documented purpose specification. Alter-
natively, there may be a willing failure to comply with regulation, but that discussion is 
not in the scope here. The implementation of a system must be reviewed against the stated 
purpose specification and in the case of a conflict, the purpose specification must be up-
dated. There should rarely be a need to update the implementation due to a purpose spec-
ification change, as the purpose specification is a tool for explaining the actual intended 
functionality of a system from the data subject’s perspective. It has been a common prac-
tice in data-intensive modern services to make purpose specifications as vague as possible 
to enable the processing of arbitrary data that has business value, but this is likely to be 
the target of regulatory intervention at least in the EU with the enforceability of the GDPR 
beginning. Lack of transparency over the data lifecycle can thus become a business risk. 
The lack of transparency in policies and terms of service, creating a disconnect between 
the stated purpose of a system and the actual usage of data, has been a source of a lot of 
critique of data protection regulation [13] [18]. Either through lack of communication or 
communication being difficult to understand, the data subject’s ability to exercise their 
right to control their personal information is limited. Large operators especially in the 
social media sector have begun developing their privacy controls into a direction that 
makes them easier to understand through the use of proper localization to the data sub-
ject’s native language and usage of descriptive iconographic language. [13] This is a 
promising development and it is in line with the intent of transparency drivers in the 
GDPR. 
As an alternative approach Anthonysamy et al. [28] present a method for analysing the 
relationship between the stated privacy policies and the privacy controls they offer to data 
subjects by extracting and mapping action statements in policy to operations available in 
controls. This sort of analysis can reveal potential differences between the communicated 
rights and freedoms of the data subject and the actual privacy controls that are imple-
mented to allow exercising those rights. Additional findings can include inconsistencies 
in stated data sources or types. 
In their study of social network operators using their described method, Anthonysamy et 
al. also call attention to issues of information asymmetry and default opt-ins, which re-
duce the control a data subject has [28].  Information asymmetry here refers to the usage 
of vague and general terms which make it difficult for the data subject to learn how their 
data is used. This paired up with default opt-ins, which the users may not be aware of, 
can make users agree to usages of their data they do not like because they do not know 
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how to decline. The practice of default opt-in in relation to privacy controls is very ques-
tionable at the least under the interpretation of informed consent as specified by the Arti-
cle 29 Working Party [21]. 
3.5 Other privacy model frameworks 
While many frameworks have been created for the benefit of data security and verifica-
tion of controls such as authorization, relatively few specialize in privacy threats or issues. 
A recent development in privacy threat modelling methodology that warrants a mention 
is the LINDDUN method. 
The LINDDUN method is a privacy threat modelling methodology. It has been built as a 
complementary support technique for privacy by design implementation. The name 
comes from the privacy threat categories that are contained in the methodology: linkabil-
ity, identifiability, non-repudiation, detectability, disclosure of information, unawareness 
and non-compliance [11]. It is strongly inspired by the STRIDE methodology. 
The LINDDUN process consists of six steps. The first step is creation and examination 
of a data flow diagram describing the overall system. The second step is mapping each 
entity of the data flow diagram to the corresponding threat categories and identification 
of potential threats. The third step is examination of the identified threats to validate them 
and figure out which ones are actually applicable to the system.  This is done through a 
collection of pre-fabricated attack path threat trees that describe common privacy vulner-
abilities relating to each specific threat category. [11] 
The fourth step of the LINDDUN process is prioritization of the analysed threats accord-
ing to their risk level. In the fifth step, the privacy requirements concerning each threat 
are identified and mapped to the threats to facilitate the choice of the mitigative solution 
as the sixth and final step of the process. [11] 
The STRIDE method is a generic security threat modelling method. Its name stands for 
spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation 
of privilege, each also referring to the risk categories the method consists of [29]. It also 
encourages the use of a data flow diagram as a view to the system and the examination of 
entities found in the diagram to identify threats related to them. 
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4. AGILE PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
4.1 Agile privacy by design principles 
To combine the privacy by design principles into an iterative development model the 
approach needs to reach beyond simply choosing which technical measures to implement 
in order to sufficiently satisfy the privacy by design principles. All relevant privacy prin-
ciples need to be considered and built in in the design phase of the system. [18] The design 
phase in an iterative development process happens gradually, often and repeatedly as new 
options are explored and new knowledge acquired. For these reasons, it is unrealistic to 
incorporate a heavy ahead-of-time process to accomplish the privacy work in the iterative 
workflow. 
Instead, it would make sense to embrace the iterative process and approach the data pro-
tection tasks also from that perspective. Proactively ensuring that each gradual increment 
individually follows the privacy by design principles is much more realistic than imple-
menting features first and then verifying each design as a whole through a separate threat 
discovery process or performing huge data protection design up front prior to implemen-
tation work in an iteration. Not only would such an approach hinder the flow of the agile 
project, it would still involve adding privacy solutions in after the fact or disconnected 
from the actual implementation. The data protection measures required need to be de-
signed and built in together with the features they relate to. 
The Scrum model has two logical points where the design choices made in a sprint are 
present, which are the sprint planning and sprint review. The sprint planning meeting 
decides what is worked on in a sprint, which directly affects the scope of the design work 
to be done. The sprint review marks the ending of a sprint and is where tasks are show-
cased and accepted or rejected. Thus, it makes sense to focus the process-oriented aspects 
here. 
There is also a common misconception that documentation is somehow anti-agile, but it 
is not true. A key characteristic of the agile approach is delaying major decisions until 
their effects are imminent. This reduces unnecessary up-front design and avoids decisions 
made with partial information. It means more of the large considerations happen later in 
the process, which should also be reflected in the agile privacy by design model. [7] In 
conjunction with this, the connotation should be that producing excessive documentation 
up-front is against the agile principle. Producing documentation just-in-time however is 
perfectly fine, and avoids the problem of producing documentation that will be outdated 
before the implementation is even relevant [6]. Following this line of thought, it makes 
sense to produce the data protection related documentation iteratively parallel to the im-
plementation of the solutions they describe. 
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4.2 Requirements 
To begin exploring the application of privacy by design in the agile design process, some 
requirements are needed to evaluate the model with. The main goal in this section is to 
identify a set of requirements sufficient to evaluate whether the produced model could 
reasonably be employed to aid in complying with the requirements of the GDPR as far as 
the design process is concerned. 
As the goal is to form a process compatible with the privacy by design ideology as it is 
seen in the context of the GDPR, the core concepts to consider as data protection issues 
are selected from both the requirements of the GDPR and the core privacy by design 
principles. These aspects are very closely related to the minimum information that needs 
to be communicated to a data subject before processing data. The following list contains 
the identified aspects of the system design process that have regulatory requirements or 
relate to the principles of privacy by design: 
• data storage, lifetime and amount/specificity 
• legitimacy of processing 
• application of data, purpose and intent 
• confidentiality 
• integrity 
• accountability, auditability  
• portability 
• risk and impact assessment, and appropriacy of protection 
• data subject’s rights, informability 
• ability to react to incidents 
• compliance. 
Data minimization. All the aspects identified have to do with personal data directly or 
indirectly. To properly design for these issues, a data controller needs to have information 
on what personal information actually exists in the system, in storage or through transit. 
Reasonable effort must be made to ensure only the minimal data necessary exists in the 
system and for the minimal time. 
Legitimacy. Every piece of personal data collected should be covered by the claim of 
legitimacy for processing data, i.e. the purpose specification. This claim represents the 
broadest category of the purpose personal data is used for in a system. Any data not cov-
ered should be considered extraneous, or the specification should be changed. The basis 
for legitimacy may be different for different users of a system. It is a tool for accounta-
bility and used to communicate to the data subject the reason for processing their personal 
data. 
Purpose. Much like the general-purpose specification, the purpose or intent of processing 
any specific data should be accounted for. Processing personal data for purposes other 
than their specified original purpose must not be allowed if it is not directly aligned with 
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the original purpose [13]. In a very small or narrow scope project the purpose may be the 
same for every piece of data and it does not need to be documented very granularly, but 
every distinct function performed based on the data should be covered by the claim of the 
intended purpose. In many cases, the purpose can simply be providing a specific service 
or function to a user that would be impossible without the data in question. 
Care must be exercised when data collection is planned based on a design from a previous 
iteration of a system. Schaar points out as an example in the German electronic proof of 
earnings project (ELENA) that data collection needs were initially based on paper forms 
that made up the previous system with little more than a cursory review, but after more 
in depth analysis it was discovered that there the necessity of certain data fields was ques-
tionable and they should most likely be removed [20]. This goes to show, that proper 
application of privacy by design requires a certain amount of scepticism towards the data 
collection requirements even when they are coming from domain experts describing the 
necessary features. 
Confidentiality. When collecting data, the data controller implicitly accepts responsibil-
ity for controlling access to the data they are trusted to process. Failure to do so would 
effectively take away the data subject’s ability to control their privacy. In this sense, data 
confidentiality is the primary guard against loss of control. Enabling confidentiality has 
two elements to it: the policy aspect and the technical aspect. On the technical side, all 
sensitive data should be appropriately protected at rest and in transport to mitigate large 
scale data breach effects, but leakage also needs to be considered during active pro-
cessing. The policy aspect is parallel to the technical side as the implementation of access 
controls and other relevant policies requires technical enablers, but using those technolo-
gies requires human choices. To enable assessing the adequacy of the confidentiality 
mechanisms, they need to be observable and that essentially means they need to be cov-
ered by documentation. 
Integrity. For the result of processing data to be useful, it generally needs to be based on 
data that is correct and up to date. When working with linked systems, propagation of 
faulty data is an inherent risk. Especially when decisions are based on profiling infor-
mation, decisions based on outdated or false data may be very damaging. To mitigate this, 
the authority of any sources of personal data should be reviewable as well as the sources 
of modifications to stored personal data. In addition to basic data security issues, integrity 
is very much an audit trail and access control problem. 
Accountability is the secondary mechanism of enabling a data subject to control their 
privacy. For a data controller to be accountable for the storing and processing personal 
data, the data subject first needs to be informed of the processing taking place and the 
details of the circumstances of the processing. Additionally, the data subject needs to be 
able to verify that their rights have been taken into account and that the responsibilities 
of the data controller have been fulfilled. In practice, this means transparency about the 
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issues discussed in this chapter on the side of the data controller and sufficient auditable 
records of activities on personal data. 
Portability requires consideration in design to identify what data can be exported and 
what additional requirements exporting it places on the system. The right to data porta-
bility is very closely related to the right to access collected data. At the bare minimum, 
this means that any barriers to data portability that are apparent in the design should be 
considered issues that need to be worked around. The portable data, according to GDPR, 
needs to be provided in a generally recognized applicable electronic form [10], which is 
a rather loose definition as far as requirements go. Properly implementing a portability 
mechanism should also minimize any issues arising from requests to inspect collected 
data. 
The privacy impact assessment, also known as data protection impact assessment by the 
GDPR [19], is a tool to describe the intention for processing personal data and assess the 
need for collecting the data as well as gauging the risks it may cause to the privacy or 
other rights of an individual. Lastly it helps design the mitigative actions to minimize the 
impact on the individual’s privacy and other rights. It is required by regulation in some 
cases, but the Article 29 Working Party recommends privacy impact assessments as a 
method to display compliance with the risk-based aspects of the privacy by design process 
[19]. There is no universal strict formal process that performing a privacy impact assess-
ment entails. The guidelines by the Article 29 Working Party include a checklist which 
expands slightly on the basic requirements of the GDPR [19]. 
In order to comply with the GDPR, all the implemented privacy solutions should be de-
signed based on a risk assessment or a privacy impact assessment. Approaching the im-
plementation from the mitigated risk perspective also helps assess that the proper privacy 
by design principles are followed instead of shopping for solutions after the fact. 
Data subject’s rights. Depending on the specifics of the law, the data subject has a num-
ber of rights concerning the data collected by a data controller. Such rights might be for 
example the right to be informed, access and inspect, transfer, correct, restrict or object 
processing and request erasure [10]. Implementing enablers for these rights will likely 
require consideration in the architecture of a system. 
Incident response. The risk based approach mentioned under other aspects also applies 
for the ultimate risk: data breach. Every system that includes personal data is susceptible 
to it, and thus it makes sense to give special care to mitigating it. It is such a significant 
matter that it occupies the third place on the OWASP privacy threats list [23]. The GDPR 
requires data controllers to notify a supervisory authority of breaches without delay, and 
to notify data subjects directly where the breach might result in a significant risk to their 
rights [10]. 
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From the data subject’s point of view, the notification of a data breach is an important 
tool for mitigating the secondary risks associated with a data breach. Identity theft is a 
globally applicable follow-up risk, but actual threats may even include physical harm 
[26]. 
4.3 Preparatory work 
The Scrum process begins with the sprint zero, where matters such as ways of working 
are defined. It also includes bootstrapping the product backlog, which means the most 
important features to build have been discovered, described and prioritized. After all this, 
the project would be ready to start planning the first sprint. 
The sprint zero is also the time to agree on the privacy goals for the project. Bier et al. 
present the concept of data protection targets as a practical set of principles that describe 
the data protection aspects that should be considered when making design decisions on 
functionality. They define confidentiality, integrity, availability, transparency, unlinka-
bility and intervenability as dimensions that should be documented for each major design 
decision. [17] Schaar presents an alternative set of data minimization, controllability, 
transparency, data confidentiality, data quality and possibility of segregation [20]. These 
should be documented and visibly present in the everyday work for the project team. 
Bier et al. Schaar 
confidentiality data confidentiality 
integrity data quality 
availability  
transparency transparency 
unlinkability  
intervenability controllability 
 data minimization 
 possibility of segregation 
Table 1. Data protection target candidates from Bier et al. and Schaar 
Table 1 shows the data protection targets chosen by both Schaar and Bier et al. with syn-
onymous concepts paired up. The lists have many of the same principles as their basis, 
expressed from a slightly differing point of view. For example, intervenability is a more 
adversarial approach to discussing the individual’s rights than controllability, which em-
phasizes the empowerment of individuals by providing them with tools to control their 
personal data. 
Availability stands out on the side of Bier et al. as more of a data security oriented target, 
but it is reasonable to argue that failure to ensure availability might endanger privacy 
when it comes to for example privacy controls and the operability of the privacy tools 
provided for the individual. The same applies to informing the individual of processing 
when the notice is latent. 
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Likewise, possibility of segregation may seem like a goal that is tied to implementation 
of a specific technology, but it is important to notice that it refers to the existence of an 
architectural enabler for a technical solution. The system architecture must enable data 
minimization in such a way that segregated processes can be used for completion of un-
related tasks without being able to access data from other contexts [20]. 
There are many other candidates that could be on the list of potential data protection tar-
gets in addition to the ones listed in Table 1. For example, many of the privacy by design 
principles could be considered data protection targets, such as proactive mitigation, port-
ability and full lifecycle security. The project team should be free to consider whatever 
data protection aspects are relevant to the domain of the project under development. 
Regardless of what set of data protection targets is selected as the initial basis, they must 
be able to evolve throughout the future iterations of the project. Deciding on a fixed set 
of requirements beforehand would be anti-agile even when it comes to privacy and data 
protection. Furthermore, settling on a set of targets and complacently executing them fails 
to consider that the data protection landscape is in a constant state of flux. Not only do 
the project requirements change during the project, new operational and technological 
threats may arise from outside of the project that require immediate attention. 
Bier et al. also introduce definition of a purpose specification as a requirement for starting 
a system design process. The purpose specification is a documented statement of a sys-
tem’s concrete purpose. They claim that changing the purpose specification in any way 
after design has started would require the initiation of a whole new design process starting 
from the purpose specification. [17] Fulfilling this requirement in an actual agile product 
development project seems very difficult. Not only does making such a statement at the 
start of a project go against the spirit of agile development, there is a high risk that such 
statement would then need to be so generic that it gives little guidance on the actual design 
work. Restarting the design process with an existing system as its basis would not have a 
large privacy impact, as the design needs to be consistently and continuously reviewed 
either way and the sort of minutiae this rule is meant to catch are likely to go unnoticed 
when restarts become mundane in an agile process. Without the requirement to start a 
new design process, this concept may be workable into a high-level goal, but other steps 
during the design process will likely not depend on it. 
Sprint zero should also include setting up all the global documents that the team will 
access and update throughout the development process. Such documents are at least the 
data flow diagram as an architectural overview and a data storage diagram overviewing 
where the personal data used in the system resides. Additional documents may include a 
data lifecycle plan for example, outlining the actions that need to be performed in order 
to take data in, protect it and then ensure it is purged from the system. 
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Figure 3. A simple data flow diagram. Adapted from [11]. 
The data flow diagram is a tool to chart the movement of data within a system. Its purpose 
is to assist in keeping track of the overall design and discovering additional data flows in 
a system as it is iteratively designed [30]. Figure 3 shows a simple example of a data flow 
diagram depicting a restaurant reservation system embedded onto the restaurant’s web-
site. The reservation system allows a customer to search for an open time-slot, make a 
reservation and potentially verify the details of the reservation. The customer is the sole 
input source and output destination in this diagram from the system’s perspective. An 
additional detail to be added as the system grows is descriptions attached to the data flows 
describing the type of data exchanged. 
As is apparent from Figure 3, all the data on way to or from the reservation database must 
travel through two distinct systems represented as processes. The longer the path of a 
flow, i.e. the more systems it passes through during its lifetime, the larger the data pro-
tection footprint of that data is. However, the quantitative length of a data flow is not that 
important, but the nature of the processes it passes through. 
The elements of the data flow diagram will likely end up being more of a logical repre-
sentation of the system’s components as it evolves, rather than a physical or structural 
representation. Using logical components allows for a more granular expression where 
necessary and to group physical processes and systems into process blocks elsewhere, if 
it improves readability of the diagram. Eventually in larger projects it may become nec-
essary to split the diagram into multiple independently maintained parts. The important 
part is that the diagram is a truthful and inclusive representation of the data flows between 
subsystems. 
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The data flow diagram is notably used as a key tool in threat discovery methods. Both the 
general-purpose method STRIDE and the privacy oriented LINDDUN method base their 
view of the system in a data flow diagram to begin the threat discovery process. [11] 
Thus, it makes sense to use it as an architectural tool in any agile development process as 
well and keep it updated as the development proceeds in order to enable usage of such 
threat discovery tools during the iterative development. 
The data storage diagram is an approach at the implementation of a data protection prac-
tice known as data mapping. The idea is to help retain in a simple and accessible format 
the information on what personal data may exist in a system, where it exists and what 
conditions govern its existence. While there is no explicit requirement to keep this infor-
mation documented in such a way, it may prove to be impossible to comply with all the 
requirements of the GDPR without engaging at least some form of data mapping. [24] In 
an agile environment, making the data mapping work a part of the iterative workflow is 
crucial to retaining accurate information with the least effort spent on documentation. 
 
Figure 4. Collected data overlaid on data flow diagram. 
The data storage diagram can be a simple extension of the data flow diagram or a docu-
ment of its own that only references the data flow diagram. The main purpose is to indi-
cate the logical location where potentially privacy sensitive information is processed and 
stored. Figure 4 shows an example of collected data overlaid on the data flow diagram 
defined previously. The customer provides their contact information in order to make a 
reservation, but as a side-effect of the web platform their network access details also get 
transmitted. The website uses an analytics tool to gather business intelligence which 
needs to combine events that occur during the customer’s session into one batch, which 
requires storage of a pseudonymous user identifier. The reservation system on the other 
hand stores some access details data in order to provide an audit trail in case of misuse of 
the system. Ultimately the user’s contact details get saved into the reservation database 
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to improve their service. A seemingly simple transaction includes a lot of secondary data 
storage. 
The key questions that the maintenance of these diagrams is trying to answer are where 
does the personal data come from, where is it stored, and for how long. Additionally, the 
accountability and liability issues should be clear for all collected data, i.e. what process 
requires the collected data and who accesses it [24]. Finally, the documentation should 
help describe where data goes from the system, whether it is shared with any external 
parties and how it eventually gets destroyed. 
These diagrams should be accessible by and editable to the whole development team. 
Minimizing the obstacles to keeping them up to date is in practice a key requirement of 
using such documents as a part of an agile process. Developers are likely to neglect parts 
of the process that are seen as a hindrance without value, which in truth are the elements 
that the Scrum retrospective process and continuous improvement are supposed to weed 
out [31]. However, it also cannot be ignored that introducing a privacy centric workflow 
into a team requires non-trivial effort from all members. 
4.4 Per-iteration work 
The Scrum sprint begins with the team committing to completing the planned work in the 
timeboxed sprint duration. All features included in the sprint should be fully finished at 
the end of sprint. This may be verified with the help of a definition of done -specification 
which outlines the conditions for considering a feature done [7]. 
In order to embrace the existing framework, put in place by the Scrum method, it would 
make sense to consider the privacy by design aspect as a part of the definition of done for 
each work item. Like everything else, this aspect of the definition of done could be ful-
filled incrementally, and in the simplest case it can simply be agreed that a specific work 
item has no privacy impact whatsoever and be done with that. It is, of course, important 
to do this only when there can be no question whether the work item has any adverse 
effects. 
To minimize overhead added by considering the privacy impact for every work item, the 
process can be broken down into several phases. The first phase happens during the sprint 
planning. For every work item accepted into the sprint a decision must be made, whether 
this work item includes aspects related to privacy sensitive areas or not. To aid with this 
decision, a simple decision tree can be used to quickly process all items, as is shown in 
Figure 5. The evaluation step can be further expanded with the specific questions that the 
evaluation should consist of at minimum, which have been left out here for brevity. 
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Figure 5.  Phase 1: Sprint planning 
The second phase includes work during the sprint as normal. Additionally, for those items 
that were deemed privacy critical, the previously agreed privacy targets are considered 
during development. This includes updating the relevant privacy documentation with 
changes made or threats introduced. In case a new threat is opened, a task for mitigating 
it must also be included. If during the development of an item originally not deemed to 
have a privacy impact it turns out the opposite is true, development can continue with this 
knowledge as if the item had originally been identified as a privacy critical item, assuming 
the time-boxing of the sprint does not jeopardize the thoroughness of the related privacy 
work. Otherwise, the item must be considered blocked and moved to the next sprint with 
the privacy work included. 
At the end of a sprint, the data protection related documents and tasks should be up to 
date if the process is followed through. This leaves the product backlog ready for the next 
sprint planning. If, however, tasks are returned to the backlog, the visibility to the scope 
of the tasks may not be perfect [7]. Thus, from a project management visibility perspec-
tive, there is a strong motivation to be thorough when assessing tasks before beginning 
the sprint. 
The third and last phase happens during the sprint review. In the sprint review, work items 
that fulfil the definition of done and their description are accepted, and defective or in-
progress items are moved to the next sprint. The goal is to verify that the produced product 
increment fulfils the sprint goals agreed on at the beginning of the sprint. [7] Figure 6 
shows the review process at a glance from the privacy point of view. The review process 
is in part a superset of the review process used before the sprint, but whereas before the 
sprint only the work item descriptions were evaluated, in the sprint review the actual im-
plementations are available for review. 
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Figure 6. Phase 3: Sprint review 
The criteria used to determine which work items are privacy critical should be based in 
the data protection targets. The team may adapt these targets into a workflow that supports 
the review instead of inhibiting it. To facilitate a thorough but efficient review, some 
specific questions can be identified in a checklist type manner. These questions should be 
used to complement the evaluation process as seen in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Example 
questions identified are: 
• Does this feature directly process personal data? 
• Does this feature affect the observability of personal data? 
• Does this feature affect the linkability of data into personal data? 
• Does this feature change the scope of data collected elsewhere? 
• Does this feature change the lifecycle of personal data collected elsewhere? 
• Does this feature introduce personal data to a module that did not previously pro-
cess any personal data? 
• Does this feature deprecate some personal data collected elsewhere? 
• Does this feature affect the agreed data protection targets? 
• Does anything prevent the affected data from being effectively exported on de-
mand? 
An affirmative answer to any question warrants closer inspection of the work item. For 
example, in the reservation system shown in Figure 4, the website analytics might be a 
work item to consider. In this case, the analytics most likely would not process personal 
data directly, but they definitely affect the observability of personal data in case the ana-
lytics system used is provided by an external manufacturer. It may also affect data linka-
bility depending on what is collected, as well as the data protection targets if review of 
external systems has not been considered before. 
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For the work items that had included the data protection work in their implementation 
already through the definition of done, instead of going through the privacy impact as-
sessment, the implementation of the protective measures should be reviewed. Focus 
should be on verifying that the identified privacy threats have been properly mitigated, 
and that identification of privacy threats to mitigate has been thoroughly carried out. In 
practice, this means verifying that the relevant documentation has been updated with the 
identified threats and the measures taken to mitigate them, and that the actual implemen-
tations of such measures are sufficient. For this the team must have sufficient expertise 
in privacy threats, or expertise in applying relevant methods such as LINDDUN. Again, 
incomplete or defective items must be returned to the product backlog and worked on in 
the next sprint. 
Changing the data protection targets between sprints is possible, and in a long running 
project it should most likely be expected. As Scrum is about continuous iterative improve-
ment and agile is about embracing change, it would be counterproductive to not update 
the process requirements to match the implementation requirements. It would also be na-
ïve to assume the information available at the start of a project is enough to arrive at the 
perfect full coverage set of data protection targets that are valid for the rest of the project’s 
duration. 
Altering the targets requires that the proper attention is given to ensuring that the current 
product passes the changed acceptance criteria or application of the criteria would be 
pointless in the first place. If the system does not match the new criteria, it should be 
treated like any other core defect and fixed in the same sprint the criteria is changed or 
before the change. The more complex and further in development a project gets, the more 
overhead there will be to ensure that the current system matches the new criteria. Because 
of this, while the agile nature allows changing the targets, it should not be done lightly. 
4.5 Deliverables produced 
The product of following the outlined process is a set of documentation that should aid in 
assessing whether it meets the requirements defined. This documentation includes the 
data flow diagram, the privacy threats identified during development and the measures 
that were taken to mitigate them. Additionally, a data storage diagram will outline where 
in the system sensitive data is introduced and stored. 
These documents make for a very good entry point into a formal audit process through a 
method like STRIDE, LINDDUN or other similar options. It could also be argued that 
these documents can be used as part of a proof that privacy by design has been exercised 
and privacy has been considered proactively and built in to the design, although the legal 
side is still unclear on it. Finally, these documents enable the operator of the system to 
produce accurate communication on what processing takes place and how in order to 
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fulfil the transparency required. It is still important not to be mistaken that the mere ex-
istence of these documents automatically means that everything is in order and the pri-
vacy by design process has been properly conducted. 
The requirements that were set forth previously need to be reviewed to achieve confidence 
in the value of doing this work. The requirements were related to both legal compliance 
and sound privacy practice. The identified aspects were data minimization, legitimate 
processing, purpose specification, confidentiality, integrity, accountability, portability. 
Additionally, there should be enablers for privacy impact assessment, fulfilling the data 
subject’s rights and incident response. 
The iterative review process is a clear enabler for data minimization, as any data intro-
duced to the system should be subject to scrutiny as long as the team properly vets the 
work items before the sprint. Similarly, a legitimate purpose specification should be re-
trievable from the work item documentation. The review process should also be sensitive 
to the scope of data being changed which is key to avoiding breach of the purpose speci-
fication. Of course, the risk that changes go unnoticed in the review still exists, either 
through unintended changes or because complex systems can have complex interactions 
that are difficult to foresee. 
Confidentiality, integrity and accountability are data security aspects that should be con-
sidered during implementation and the sufficiency of the measures to protect the data 
must have been reviewed. As the measures are built parallel to the implementation of the 
features that rely on them for protection, it is less likely that protective measures are ap-
plied without actual risk-based assessment of their effectiveness. Moreover, consideration 
for integrity and accountability should end up being built into the features that concern 
mutation or access of personal information. Again, the documentation of the work item 
should reflect this and as such it should be possible to extract a description of how and 
why these technical measures were implemented and what threats they mitigate. 
If portability is on the data protection targets, it gets considered for every feature that 
deals with data that might be exported. While this process might not directly drive the 
development towards enhancing data portability, it is an aspect that the development team 
should include in their data protection targets if they wish to be compliant. The process 
does provide an additional enabler in the sense of the data flow and storage diagrams 
which make it easier to plan how to implement potential portability support features. 
The iterative review process most likely does not fulfil all the requirements of a compre-
hensive formal privacy impact assessment without extra review and documentation effort, 
but it serves as a small-scale variant of one. It should be straightforward to apply what is 
learned during the iterative process to perform a full scope impact assessment if the need 
arises. At the very least, the resulting documentation can be transformed into a privacy 
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impact assessment format. The privacy impact assessment is not a strict requirement un-
less the data processing constitutes a high-risk category. 
The technical implementation of making it possible for a data subject to exercise their 
rights needs to be considered during the iterative review, and issues related these should 
be found in the documentation. However, there is an operational side to the individual’s 
rights that the process cannot enforce. Similarly, incident response requires technical en-
ablers in the form of intrusion detection capability and accountability measures, but there 
is an operational side that the process cannot guarantee. The documentation produced will 
however be a valuable asset in the operational execution of these aspects too, especially 
in relation to producing an incident response notification for the supervisory authority. 
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5. EVALUATION 
5.1 Reviewing research goals and limitations 
The goals of the thesis were to explore how it would be possible to fulfil the privacy by 
design process requirements introduced in the GDPR while using an agile software de-
velopment process, what the state of privacy by design as a privacy framework is and 
what the privacy threat landscape looks like in 2017. This was done through review of 
existing research on the privacy by design principles and other methods to approach the 
issue of building privacy integrally into systems. The data protection requirements of the 
GDPR were also reviewed and used as a basis while forming the general requirements 
for the agile privacy by design model. 
Based on these requirements and principles, the agile privacy by design model was intro-
duced in Chapter 4. The introduced model was based on the combination of multiple 
different interpretations of privacy by design, as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as docu-
mented real case examples, such as described by Schaar [20]. Chapter 4.2 discussed the 
individual requirements and principles which the model was based on. 
The outcome of this study process was the agile privacy by design model, overlaid on the 
Scrum method. The model consists of a set of tasks which produce documentation about 
the usage of privacy by design principles as well as other privacy and data protection 
related requirements such as data portability. To be clear, this documentation is the result 
of considering the data protection targets during development, but it cannot be reliably 
used to prove that the privacy by design principles were followed. As the existence of 
documentation is only the end state, it is impossible to show how the process arrived at 
that state. 
The fact that there are no universally acknowledged criteria for a privacy by design pro-
cess makes formal evaluation of the agile privacy by design process somewhat difficult. 
However, with proper selection of the data protection targets and assuming the process is 
fully adopted, the process is semantically identical to exercising privacy by design with-
out the agile model. Another issue related to the lack of specificity in the privacy by de-
sign implementation is that there is no well-defined universal process which to follow in 
order to practice privacy by design. The model solves this by leaving the data protection 
target selection up to the project team, which is also a weakness as it requires the team to 
have sufficient privacy expertise to understand what choices to make. 
While not critique of the agile privacy by design model specifically, the fact that privacy 
by design does not guarantee protection from future threats still applies to it as well. The 
accuracy of any predictions made depend entirely on the expertise of the team employing 
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the method. Similarly, the quality of the privacy work and the usefulness of the documen-
tation that is produced as a result of following the process depend entirely on the project 
team’s ability to understand and assess privacy issues. In order to implement privacy by 
design well, the team needs to have an understanding of privacy beforehand. The agile 
model can help in paying attention to things at the correct time, but it cannot replace the 
lack of experience. 
The requirement of privacy experience was seen in other privacy tools as well. For ex-
ample, the studies on the LINDDUN method [11] showed that in order to fully benefit 
from such a framework, the user must have sufficient expertise and experience in han-
dling privacy related matters.  
Other security frameworks such as Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle also in-
clude privacy as a part of them, but their focus is heavily on the data security aspect 
instead of privacy as a right of an individual. This has been a common development di-
rection in the software service industry. In this sense, employing the agile privacy by 
design model can help thinking of the human side of privacy issues. It may be beneficial 
to combine the frameworks to achieve a balance of focus between operational security, 
data security and privacy. 
The model is as of yet untested in a large-scale project undertaking. Lack of details from 
the Article 29 Working Party make predicting how it would perform difficult. With fur-
ther information on how to interpret the design requirements of the GDPR, more research 
could be done to learn how to support teams in fulfilling those requirements while also 
making the privacy enhancement industry better for everyone. 
As for the state of privacy by design as a privacy engineering methodology, there is no 
general consensus on the best way to advance apart from the fact that privacy needs to be 
pushed further as an integral part of the software development flow. This is clear from 
the problems with the evaluation of the agile privacy by design model. Many advocates 
and researchers in Europe have pushed for privacy by design to be adopted as a global 
standard, but there is still much work to be done until it is a universally understood, well-
defined tool for privacy engineering. As ENISA stated in their 2014 report, policy makers, 
researchers, media and legislators all need to pitch in to provide the software development 
industry with the kinds of practical tools that enable the intuitive adoption of privacy 
engineering through privacy by design principles [13]. Better practical and regulatory 
guidelines need to be developed still and privacy engineering needs a stronger legislative 
mandate to push compliance [13]. Privacy standards need to be globally unified to enable 
actors in the global marketplace to interoperate and collaborate to build better privacy for 
the products and services of tomorrow. 
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The privacy landscape in general is looking brighter by the day, but the few dark clouds 
around are darker than one would hope. Governments need to start enforcing on the sys-
tematic breach of civilians’ privacy by authorities and intelligence agencies. A proper 
balance must be defined between the rights of the individual and the benefit of the major-
ity. The situation in Europe is not as grim as globally and the global development should 
be lobbied to follow the same progress with regard to the protection of individuals’ rights. 
5.2 Future research 
A trial run of the agile privacy by design model in a controlled project environment would 
be a great first study to continue on. Validation of the model is still an open question. 
Perhaps real project experience on the issues and strengths of the model might aid in 
empirically validating or invalidating it in its proposed form. 
It would also be an interesting study to attempt to gain statistically significant feedback 
on the implementation of privacy by design in real projects. Privacy by design is a repeat-
ing topic in privacy research, but not a lot of work exists trying to quantify the experience 
of applying it. It would also be a great opportunity for a comparative study between pro-
jects that employ a defined privacy by design framework and projects that do not follow 
a framework model. 
Additionally, research on the developer and project management perception of applying 
agile privacy by design would be beneficial for further development of the model. As it 
stands, a large part of the model is reliant on the privacy expertise of the developer. The 
model could be more widely useful if it was possible to enhance it so that it provides more 
guidance towards a safe default set of data protection targets for example. 
After the enforcement of the GDPR begins and development teams gain experience in the 
unique challenges it brings forth, it would be also an opportunity to research the applica-
tion of the model globally. Whether the success or failure of the privacy by design ap-
proach as a legislative measure causes pressure to adopt or abandon development of fur-
ther regulatory measures like it is also a long-term research opportunity. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, it has been shown that it is possible to apply the privacy by design principles 
in a defined iterative framework. The adaptation of agile practices for specialized pur-
poses is an effective tool to guide the focus of the workflow. This framework does not 
solve issues that are inherent with privacy by design itself, but it eases the introduction of 
other related privacy and threat discovery tools into the agile development workflow. The 
application of the framework will also leave the project team with a better understanding 
of the structure of their system and provide a better starting point for thinking about op-
erative privacy issues than using no framework at all. 
The background research on the issues related to implementing privacy controls into com-
plex systems has shown that privacy has often been sacrificed over functionality. The 
application of technical measures as a panacea or so-called shopping for privacy can mask 
underlying structural issues in development practices. Privacy is a complex field and the 
lack of enforcement action on the regulations gives too much incentive for non-compli-
ance. The adversarial views between privacy and security, privacy and functionality or 
privacy and business have been problematic for the development of more open and fair 
information processing practices. Also, the importance of transparency and visibility into 
the details of data processing cannot be overstated. 
It has also been learned that there are multiple open issues in applying privacy by design 
as a regulated mandatory design methodology and that those issues might not have simple 
solutions at all. However, these issues may be ameliorated with the introduction of more 
accurate guidelines on the application of privacy by design in practice. It is important to 
remember that the GDPR is the first time that privacy by design is mandated by regulation 
at such scale and it is to be expected that there will be practical issues to resolve. 
Finally, it can be said that the development of privacy regulation has been moving in a 
better direction in the last few decades both globally and in Europe. The internet society 
is still a relatively young phenomenon. Governments and legislators need to work faster 
than ever in order to protect the rights and freedoms of individual citizens in the ubiqui-
tous information society. A lot of work is required to provide governments and businesses 
with the necessary tools to fully embrace the opportunities of the modern era in a privacy 
positive manner. 
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